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]
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DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

i
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from an Order entered after Judgment
denying the Defendants Motion to Correct the Sentences imposed
pursuant to Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
in the First Circuit Court of the State of Utah, County of
Cache, Logan City Department.

This appeal is taken pursuant

to the provisions of Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 77~18a-l,(1)(b), (1990 Amendment).
The jurisdiction is invoked upon this Honorable Court to entertain
this appeal under the provisions of Utah Ann. § 78-2a-3(d), and
§ 78-4-11, (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the

Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence because of the conflict between the written judgment and the oral pronouncement of
sentence.
The standard of review for this Court to review this issue

-1-

on appeal is that it is a question of law which will be
reviewed under a correctness standard.

City of Monticello

v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 516 (Utah 1990); State v. Ramirez,
817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991).
The Defendant preserved this issue for appeal by filing
a Motion to Correct the Sentence in the trial court in December
of 1993.

A hearing was held on said Motion in the trial court

on May 10, 1994 and the trial court denied the Defendant's Motion
to Correct the Sentence by a Written Order signed the Honorable
Alfred C. Van Wagenen on July 19, 1994.
2.

Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the

Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence because the sentence
imposed for the offense of Assault was an illegal sentence or
a sentence imposed in an illegal manner because the trial court
lack jurisdiction to impose judgment and sentence and was barred
under the Double Jeopardy Clauses and the Due Process Clauses of
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution from imposing any
judgment and sentence for the offense of Assault.
The standard of review for this Court to review this issue
on appeal is that it is a question of law which will be reviewed
under a correctness standard.

City of Monticello v. Christensen,

supra,; State v. Ramirez, supra.
The Defendant preserved this issue for appeal by filing
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a Motion to Correct the Sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in the trial court in
December of 1993.

A hearing was held on said Motion in the

trial court on May 10/ 1994 and the trial court denied the
Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence by a Written Order
signed by the Honorable Alfred C. Van Wagenen on July 19, 1994.
DETERMINATIVE LAWS
The following determinative laws of this case are set
forth verbatim in the Addendum:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1953 as amended).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1953 as amended).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305, (1953 as amended).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-4, (1953 as amended).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6( 2) (e), (1953 as amended).
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-914, (1990 Amendment).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-la-l, (1953 as amended).
Rule 50, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 81, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution.
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution.
Article I,§ 12, Utah Constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case:
The Defendant was initially charged by Information in

the First Circuit Court of the State of Utah, County of Cache,
Logan City Department, Case No. 911000628 with one count of
Assault upon a Peace Officer in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-102.4 (1953 as amended), and one count of Interference
with Arresting Officer in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8305, (1953 as amended).
B.

Course of Proceedings:
A jury trial was held in the First Circuit Court on the

27th day of September, 1991, whereupon the jury returned a
verdict of guilty to each count charged in the Information.
The Defendant appeared for sentencing in the trial court
on November 15, 1991.

The trial court prior to imposition of

sentence, set aside the jury verdict on Count I of the Information, the offense of Assault upon a Peace Officer on grounds
of insufficient evidence adduced at the trial.

The trial court

thereupon found the Defendant guilty of the offense of Assault
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102, (1953 as amended).
The trial court thereupon imposed sentence for the two offenses
and fined the Defendant a total of $ 750.00.
The trial court signed a written Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) which was filed with the Clerk of the Court on November
26, 1991.

Page One of the Judgment, Sentence, (Commitment)
-4-

shows that the Defendant was convicted and sentenced for one
count of Simple Assault and one count of Interference with an
Arrest by Peace Officer.

Page two of the written Judgment,

Sentence, (Commitment) shows that the Defendant was convicted
and sentenced for the offense of Assault upon a Peace Officer
and an additional count of Interference with an Arrest by a
Peace Officer.
The Defendant in December of 1993, filed a written motion
pursuant to Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
to Correct the Illegal Sentences imposed by the conflicts between
the written Judgment and Sentence and the oral pronouncement of
sentence.

Additionally, the Defendant claimed in said Motion

that the sentence for the offense of Assault was an illegal
sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner.
A hearing was held in the trial court on Defendant's Motion
to Correct the Sentence on May 10, 1994 upon which the trial
court denied the Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence.
C.

Disposition in Trial Court:
The by a written Order, dated July 19, 1994, denied the

Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentences and the written
Judgment previously signed by the Court.
D.

Statement of Facts:
The Defendant was lawfully on the property owned by his

immediate family known as Carlsen's Gas for Less on May 19,
1991 when he was arrested by former Logan City Police Officer,
Tim Gil Duron for the offenses of Assault upon a Peace Officer
-5-

and Interference with an Arrest by a Peace Officer.

Tim Gil

Duron was not scheduled to work for the Logan City Police
Department on May 19, 1991, but entered the property in a police
vehicle carrying a firearm and handcuffs.

The record shows that

Gary Bruce Carlsen ordered Mr. Duron to leave such property when
he appeared in the wash bay and observed Mr. Duron committing a
crime on the property by strangling the Defendant with a car wash
wand. (Trial Tr. 223-241).
An Information was filed in the First Circuit Court of the
State of Utah, County of Cache, Logan City Department, Case No.
911000628 charging the Defendant with the offense of Assault
upon a Peace Officer in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4,
(1953 as amended) and with the offense of Interference with
Arresting Officer in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305,
(1953 as amended).
A jury trial was held in the First Circuit Court on the
27th day of September, 1991, whereupon the jury returned a verdict
of guilty to both counts as charged in the Information.
The Defendant appeared for sentencing on November 15, 1991,
and pointing out at Page 4 through Page 6 of the Sentencing
Transcript, the following proceedings were held in the trial
court:
THE COURT: The Court, on its own motion, pursuant to
Rule 81 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, they apply
in all criminal cases if no statute or rule conflicts,
and if there's—in this particular case, the Court knows
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of no conflicting rule or statute, and so pursuant
to Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, I'm
going to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
which in effect will set aside the conviction of the
Class A misdemeanor, guilty of assault on a peace officer,
and will find you guilty of a lesser included offense,
Class B assault.
I find that essentially, that you f re entitled to
the ruling and the finding of simple assault as a
matter of law and I111 give you some reasons for that:
In other words, I find that essentially there was
not evidence that would justify the jury in finding that
Officer Durand was acting within the scope of his authority
as a peace officer at that time.
Let me just read this. The Court rules as a matter
of law that in this case, Officer Durand was not acting
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer at
the time he was assaulted by the defendant. The assault
would therefore be a Class B misdemeanor, simple assault,
a lesser included offense of Count I.
There's no question but what the jury found you guilty
of all of the necessary elements of assault, the Class B
misdemeanor. One additional element was necessary to
find you guilty of assault on a peace officer, and that
was that the individual you assaulted was acting within
the scope of his authority as a peace officer. And that's
the only element that I disagree with the jury, and that's
the basis for this ruling.
Utah Code Annotated 77-1-a-l states that the duties
of peace officers consist primarily of the prevention and
detection of crime and the enforcement of criminal statutes
and ordinances. The legislature desires that such duties
not be hindered or interferred with and therefore, had
increased the penalty imposed if a peace officer is
assaulted while performing such duties.
Now, police department rules and regulations may
require police officers to keep police vehicles washed and
properly maintained. These rules may also require that an
officer be neat in his appearance, with a proper hair cut
and clean uniforms. Such activities may prepare an officer
so he can perform his law enforcement duties, but they are
not the type of duties given special consideration and
protection under the law.
-7-

If an off-duty peace officer were assulted as he
sat in the barber's chair, or as he was picking up his
uniform from the dry cleaners, or as he was washing his
patrol car, the assault would be the same type of assault
as would take place on an ordinary citizen who may be
doing the exact same thing•
In this case, Officer Durand was simply washing a
car on this Sunday morning. He was not on duty, not in
uniform and in no way was seeking to prevent or detect
crime or enforce any criminal statute or ordinance*
Under these circumstances, when the defendant
assaulted Officer Durand, the defendant committed a simple
assault, a Class B misdemeanor. The Court therefore finds
the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of
assault, a Class B misdemeanor, notwithstanding the verdict
of the jury in this matter.
So, there are two charges that you're no convicted
of, and it's time for sentencing. Count I would be simple
assault, Count II would be interferring in arrest, both
Class B misdemeanors.
Is there anything you'd like to say before I impose
sentence?
MR. CARLSEN: No. Other than I believe i'm the one that
was assaulted during this incident. I—I was required to
post bail, I had to pay $ 130 medical expenses from being
strangled.
The trial court thereafter signed a written Judgment,
Sentence, (Commitment) which was filed on November 26, 1991.
Page one of the written Judgment and Sentence states as follows:
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 76-5-102 SIMPLE
Plea: Not Guilty
Fine:
1075.00
Jail: 180 DA

ASLT
Find: Guilty - Jury
Susp:
700.00
Susp: 180 DA

Charge: 76-8-305 INTERF
Plea: Not Guilty
Fine:
1075.00
Jail: 180 DA

IN ARREST BY P/0
Find: ,Guilty - Jury
SuspS700.00
Susp: 180 DA
-8-

Page two of the written Judgment and Sentence states as
follows:
Sentence:
Deft present w/o Counsel/ Prosecutor present
PRO: SCOTT WYATT
TAPE 91457
COUNT: 1
Judge:
Chrg: ASLT ON P.O.
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Ju
Fine Amount:
1075.00 Suspended: 700.00
Jail: 180 DAYS
Suspended: 180 DAYS
Chrg: INTERF ARREST PO Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Ju
Fine Amount:
1075.00
Suspended:
700.00
Jail:

180 DAYS

Suspended:

180 DAYS

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant submits that the trial court erred in denying
the Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence filed pursuant to
Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure because the
written Judgment and Sentence conflicts with the oral pronouncement of sentence and the oral sentence prevails.

Additionally,

the Defendant submits that the sentence for the offense of
Simple Assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102/
(1953 as amended) is an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed
in an illegal manner because the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to impose sentence and the judgment and sentence was barred by
the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the United States
and Utah Constitution.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WRITTEN JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE CONFLICTS WITH THE
ORAL PRONOUNCEMENT OF SENTENCE.
The Defendant in December of 1993, filed a written Motion
to Correct the Sentence.

A hearing was held on May 10, 1994

upon which the trial court denied the Defendant's Motion to
-9-

Correct the Sentence and written Judgment and Sentence,
The Court in State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 at 679
(Utah App. 1991) observed:
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the "continuing
jurisdiction of a trial court to correct an illegal
sentence." State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991).
Because an illegal sentence is void, the court does
not lose jurisdiction over the sentence until that
sentence has been corrected. Id. The negative implication of this principle is also spelled out in
Babbel. Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it
loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case Id.
(citing State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 74, 7 P.2d 825,
827 (1932). Thus, the district court's jurisdiction
over the resentencing turns on whether the initial
sentence was legal.
A court can correct an illegal sentence at any time.
Utah R.Crim.P. 22(e) (1991); Babbel, 813 P.2d at 87;
Lee Lim, 79 Utah 74, 7 P.2d 826-27.
The written Judgment and Sentence in the instant case shows
that the Defendant was convicted and sentenced on four different
misdemeanor offenses, and conflicts with the oral pronouncement
of sentence.

The written Judgment and Sentence shows that the

Defendant was convicted and sentence for one count of Simple
Assault; one count of Assault upon a Peace Officer; and two
counts of Interference with an Arrest by a Peace Officer.

The

transcript of the oral pronouncement of sentence imposed on
November 15, 1991 shows that the Defendant was sentenced for
one count of Simple Assault and one count of Interference with
an Arrest by a Peace Officer.
Additionally, the written Judgment and Sentence shows that
the jury found the Defendant guilty for the offense of Simple
Assault.

The transcript of the November 15, 1991 Sentencing
-10-

shows that it was the Court and not the jury that found the
Defendant guilty of the offense of Simple Assault.

The pro-

ceedings at page 4 of the Sentencing Transcript went as follows:
"I'm going to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict/ which
in effect will set aside the conviction of the Class A misdemeanor, guilty of assault on a peace officer, and will find
you guilty of a lesser included offense/ Class B assault." Again,
at page 6 of the transcript the Court stated: "The Court therefore finds the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense
of assault, a Class B misdemeanor/ notwithstanding the verdict
of the jury in this matter.
Where there is a direct conflict between an unambiguous
oral court order and a written order, the oral order controls.
See, e.g., United States v* Munoz-Dela Rosa, 495 F.2d 253, 256
(9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Mason, 440 F.2d 1293/ 12991300 (10th Cir. 1971) (the oral sentence prevails where there
is a variance between the oral and written sentence).
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Lorrah/ 761 P.2d 1388/
1389 (Utah 1988) observed:
The trial court may correct clerical mistakes in
judgments at any time, with or without notice as the
court may order. Utah R.Crim.P. 30(b). A clerical
error, as contradistinguished from judicial error, is
not "the deliberate result of the exercise of judicial
reasoning and determination." State v. Mossman, 75 Or.
App. 385/ 706 P.2d 203/ 204 (1985) (quoting 1 Freeman,
Judgments § 146/ at 284 (5th ed.)). Clerical errors
have frequently been corrected by this Court without
benefit of notice to a defendant. State v. Larson/
-11-

758 P.2d 901 (1988); State v. Gerrish, 746 P.2d 762
(Utah 1987). To ascertain the clerical nature of the
mistake, this Court will look to the record to harmonize
the intent of the court with the written judgment. State
v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987 (Utah 1986).
The Defendant respectfully submits that the trial court
in this case erred in denying the Defendant's Motion to Correct
the Sentence and the errors in the written judgment.
POINT II
THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE FOR THE OFFENSE OF SIMPLE
ASSAULT IS AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE OR A SENTENCE IMPOSED
IN AN ILLEGAL MANNER.
The Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in
denying the Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence because
the sentence imposed for the offense of Simple Assault is an
illegal sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Hyams, 230 P. 349,
350 (Utah 1924) observed:
"The judgment of the court must in all cases be based
upon the verdict of the jury, and the verdict of the
jury must be responsive to the issue joined by the indictment or information and the plea of the person on
trial thereto, otherwise the court is without jurisdiction
to render judgment thereon."
The Judgment and Sentence for the offense of Simple Assault
in the instant case was not based upon the verdict of the jury
because the verdict of the jury was set aside by the trial court
on grounds of insufficient evidence adduced at trial.
The provisions of Utah Code Annotated, § 77-1-4, (1980
Amendment) provides as follows:
No person shall be punished for a public offense until
convicted in a court having jurisdiction.
-12-

The pertinent part of the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-1-6, (1980 Amendment) provides:
(1)

In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:

(2)

In addition:

(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of
a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or
upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has
been waived, or, in case of an infraction, upon a
judgment by a magistrate.
The Defendant in this case made a written request for a
jury trial more than ten (10) days prior to the scheduled trial.
The Defendant has not been convicted by a jury or waived such
right to a jury trial because the jury verdict was set aside
by the trial court on grounds of insufficient evidence adduced
at trial.
The Defendant further contends that the sentence for the
offense of Simple Assault was an illegal sentence or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner because the trial court setting
aside the jury verdict for the offense of Assault upon a Peace
Officer on grounds of insufficient evidence was a factual
resolution in favor of the Defendant which constituted an
acquittal, and the trial court was barred by the Double Jeopardy
and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and Utah Constitutions from
entering any judgment or imposing any sentence for the offense
of simple assault.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d
1061, 1064 (Utah 1983) observed:
The label attached to a ruling by a trial judge is
not determinative of whether the termination of a
-13,-

criminal prosecution ia an acquittal. United States
v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96-97, 98 S.Ct. 2197, 21962197, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1980); United States v. Martin
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349,
1354, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). A ruling that constitutes
a factual resolution in favor of the defendant on one
or more of the elements of the offense charged is an
acquittal.
A trial court may arrest a jury verdict when the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of
the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt as to that element.

State v. Petree, 659

P.2d 443 (Utah 1983); State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah
1982); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976); State v.
Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah App. 1991) aff'd, 852 P.2d
981 (Utah 1993).
This Court in State v. Willard, 801 P.2d 189 (Utah App.
1990) held that the trial judge's order suppressing evidence
and dismissing the case with prejudice constituted an acquittal.
The trial court prior to imposing sentence at the sentencing
hearing, ruled that as a matter of law, the evidence adduced at
trial was insufficient to sustain the Defendant's conviction
for the offense of Assault upon a Peace Officer as charged in
the Information and set aside the jury verdict.
The Defendant respectfully submits that this ruling did
arrest the jury verdict under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure and constituted an acquittal.

-14-

Once a criminal charge has resulted in an acquittal
by the trier of fact, the prohibition against double joepardy
prevents that determination from ever again being challenged.
It is of no consequences that the determination was made as
a matter of law by a directed verdict of acquittal, or as a
matter of fact by the trier of fact.

Musselman, Id. at 1065.

The Montana Supreme Court in State v. LeCoure, 158 Mont.
340, 491 P.2d 1228 (1971) held that defendant who had been
charged in Federal Court with assaulting an FBI agent engaged
in performance of his official dutiest>u£ acquitted for failure
to show that agent was acting in his official capacity when
assault occurred could not be prosecuted in state court on
second-degree assault charge arising out of same transaction.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Sorenson, 639 P.2d
179 (Utah 1981) held that a harsher sentence imposed by the
trial court in violation of the Due Procees and Double Jeopardy
Clauses was an illegal sentence.
The trial court in the instant case was barred under the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Utah Constituions
from entering any judgment or imposing any sentence for the
offense of Simple Assault and therefore illegal.
The Defendant also contends that the trial court improperly
applied Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in setting
aside the jury verdict and entering a judgment of guilt to
-15-

the offense of assault and imposing sentence thereon.
The pertinent part of the provisions of Rule 81 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules
of procedures shall also govern in any aspect of criminal
proceedings where there is no other applicable statute
or rule, provided that any rule so applied does not
conflict with any statutory or constitutional requirement.
As previously discussed, it would appear that the trial
court's application of Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure conflicts with numerous statutes and particularly
the application of Rule 50 conflicts with Rule 23 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Double Jeopardy Clauses
of the United States and Utah Constitution.
Additionally, the trial court reinstated the Defendant's
conviction and the jury verdict in the written Judgment and
Sentence were it shows that the Defendant was convicted and
sentenced for the offense of Assault upon a Peace Officer on
page two and signed by the trial judge.
The Defendant being charged with the offense of Assault
upon a Peace Officer was precluded from defending against the
offense of Simple Assault and the trial court declined to give
the jury numerous instructions requested by the Defendant on the
basis of the Utah Supreme Court decision in State v. Gardiner,
814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991) which held that numerous defenses
are not available to a person charged with the offense of
-16-

Assault upon a Peace Officer.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant respectfully submits that the trial court
erred in denying Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence
and the errors in the written Judgment and Sentence.

The

Defendant respectfully submits that this Honorable Court should
reverse the trial court's Order denying the Defendant's Motion
to Correct the Sentence and the written Judgment and Sentence,
and that the matter be remanded to the trial court with instructions to correct the sentence and written judgment and
sentence in full compliance with this Court's decision.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this£

of April, 1995.

DAVID CRAIG CARLS^tfJ
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid to the following
listed below on this O

^

day of April, 1995:

Logan City Prosecutor's Office
Scott L. Wyatt
255 North Main
Logan, Utah 84321
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

INFORMATION
CO

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,
DOB: 03-05-49
Defendant.
t\$ottv dhrii-ic^'x**-'

"XI

.

,.

CO.

The undersigned Richard Hcndricka under oath states on informacbion
and belief that the above named defendant(s) committed the crimes
of:
COUNT 1:
CRIME:
IN VIOLATION OF:
CLASSIFICATION:
AT:
ON OR ABOUT:

Assault on Peace Officer
Section 76-5-102.4 U.C.A. 1953, as amended,
Class A Misdemeanor
Cache County, State of Utah
May 19, 1991

COUNT 2:
CRIME:
IN VIOLATION OF:
CLASSIFICATION:
AT:
ON OR ABOUT:

Interference with Arresting Officer
Section 76-8-305 U.C.A. 1953, as amended
Class B Misdemeanor
Cache County, State of Utah
May 19, 1991

The acts of the defendant(s) constituting the crime(s) were:
COUNT 1:
That the said Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid, attempted
with unlawful force or violence to do bodily injury to another, to
wit: Gil Duron, a peace officer, with knowledge that said Gil Duron
was a peace officer and when said peace officer was acting within
the scope of his authority as a peace officer.
COUNT 2:
That the said Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid, having
knowledge that a peace officer was seeking to effect a lawful
arrest, did interfere with the arrest by use of force.

V/caCiv

« *•'-/...

pol

JUN \ 2 1991

IV

a

The information is based on evidence obtained from the following
witnesses: Gil Duron.

J^4>K. M^
T

Authorized for presentment
and filing by the Cache
County Attorney:
BY:

-fk2iU'&.lK&

06-03-91

AA.'V^/-'**

COMPLAINANT

Subscribed and sworn to before
me this
*
day of
, 19 9/ .
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Summons Issued.

CIRCUTF~COURT JUDGE
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FIRST CIRCUIT COURT - LOGAN
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
VS

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

CARLSEN, DAVID CRAIG
316 S. MAIN
LOGAN
UT

CASE NO:
DOB:
TAPE:
DATE:

84321

911000628
03/05/49
91457 COUNT: 1
11/15/91

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 76-5-102 SIMPLE ASLT
Plea: Not Guilty
Find: tSuilty - Jury
Fine:
1075.00
Susp:
700.00
Jail: 180 DA
Susp: 180 DA

ACS:

0

Charge: 76-8-305 INTERF IN ARREST BY P/O
Plea: Not Guilty
Find: Guilty - Jury
Fine:
1075.00
Susp:
700.00
Jail: 180 DA
Susp: 180 DA

ACS:

0

FEES AND ASSESSMENTS:
Fine Description: FINE,FEE,FORF.-STATE
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS:
Credit:
0.00 Paid:

0.00

Due:

750.00

0.00

Due:

750.00

PROBATION AGENCIES:
Agency Name:
Agency Address:
Agency Address:
City/State/Zip:
Phone:

FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
140 NORTH 100 WEST
LOGAN
(801) 752-6893

UT 84321

PROBATION TERMS & CONDITIONS:
VIOLATE NO LAWS
DEF ON INFORMAL COURT PROBATION
DEF TO PAY FINES @ RATE OF $100/MO BEGIN 12/5
CALENDAR:
SENTENCING

11/15/91 01:30 PM in rm 2 with CLINT S JUDKINS

CARLSEN, DAVID CRAIG

CASE NO: 911000628

PAGE

POCKET INFORMATION;
Sentence:
Deft present w/o Counsel, Prosecutor present
PRO: SCOTT WYATT
TAPE: 91457
COUNT: 1
Judge:
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Ju
Chrg: ASLT ON P.O.
700.00
1075.00
Suspended:
Fine Amount:
Suspended: 180 DAYS
Jail:
180 DAYS
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Ju
Chrg: INTERF ARREST PO
1075.00
Suspended:
Fine Amount:
700.00
Jail:
180 DAYS
Suspended: 180 DAYS

BY THE COURT

QC [/fi*. Lik

DGE/CIRCUIT COURT
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT.

2

LOG AH O i S T R j n r
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DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN
Defendant in Pro Se
P.O. Box 148
Logan, Utah 84323-0148
Telephone: (801) 752-8162
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE

Plaintiff,
-vsDAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,

Case No. 911000628
Defendant.
The above-entitled matter coming on for hearing in this
Court on the 10th day of May, 1994 on Defendant's Motion to Correct
the Sentence.

The Plaintiff appearing and being represented by

Logan City Prosecutor, Scott L. Wyatt. The Defendant appearing in
person and not represented by counsel.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED for good cause appearing that the
Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence and the written Judgment
previously signed by this Court is hereby denied.

DATED this

1994.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

proposed

ORDER

DENYING

DEFENDANT'S

MOTION

TO

CORRECT

SENTENCE, postage prepaid to the following listed below on this
12th day of July, 1994:
Scott L. Wyatt
Logan City Prosecutor
255 North Main
Logan, Utah 84321
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IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH

2

COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT

3
4

-O0oCITY OF LOGAN,

5
6
7

Plaintiff,

Case No. 911000628

vs.

SENTENCING

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,

8

Defendant.

9

-oOo-

10
11
12
13
14

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 15th day of November,
1991, the above-entitled action was held before the
HONORABLE ALFRED VAN WAGENEN, sitting as Judge in the abovenamed Court, and that the following proceedings were had.

15

-oOo-

16
17

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the City:

MR. SCOTT L. WYATT
Logan City Prosecutor
255 North Main
Logan, Utah
84321

For the Defendant:

MR. DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN
Appearing Pro Se

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

PENNY C. ABBOTT, C.S.R.
3241 SOUTH 4840 WEST
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH
84120
PHONE i 966-4863

p R

11

°S

E E D I N G S

2

3I
4

THE COURT; All right. This is the time set for
sentencing.

5

Before sentencing, is there anything that you'd

6

like to, Mr, Carlsen, any motions that you'd like to make

7 I or anything that you'd like to say?
8

,

MR. CARLSEN: Not other than the motion for

9 I arrest of judgment.
10

THE COURT: All right.

11

As indicated, we talked briefly in chambers as

12

indicated, Mr. Wyatt hasn't even seen this motion for arrest

13

of judgment,

14

statutes ar.d whe rules, the case law and so forth, the

15

Court, in considering the evidence in this particular

16

matter, the Court declines and will deny your motion for an

I have glanced over it and considering the

17 I arrest of judgment in this matter.
18
19

I think you had a motion that you wanted to make,
J Mr. Wyatt.
MR. WYATT: Yes, your Honor.

20

I'd like to move

21

to have my—one of my two exhibits, I believe it was Exhibit

22

No. 1, the car wash wand, returned.
THE COURT: You don't have any objection to that,

23

24
25

do you?

MR. CARLSEN:

Well, I was thinking if this case

1

goes on appeal, couldn't there be a photograph made of it

2

in place of t h e —

3
4
5
6

THE COURT:

Yeah.

Let's make a photograph.

MR. WYATT:

I'm very willing to do that.

THE COURT:

W e ' l l — t h e Court will order that a

photograph of the car wash wand be made and replaced and

7

put in the place of the exhibit, and that exhibit will be

8

returned to you, Mr. Wyatt.

9

MR. WYATT:

10

that he c a n —

11
12

I will send a copy to the defendant so

I

13

THE COURT

All right.

MR. WYATT

— s e e it.

THE COURT

As I indicated, as we discussed this

14

matter briefly in chambers, the Court has struggled some

15

time with regards to the charge of assault on a peace

16

officer.

17

The jury found that you were in fact guilty of

18

Count I, the assault on a peace officer; but I instructed thej

19

jury that they could have found you guilty of a lesser

20

included offense of assault, just a simple assault o n —

21

like would take place on the ordinary citizen.

22

be a Class B misdemeanor*

23

That would

The jury did not find that, but they did find you

24

guilty of the originally charged count, assault on a peace

25

officer.

1

2

3

4
5

T h e C o u r t , o n its own m o t i o n , p u r s u a n t to R u l e
81 o f the U t a h R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , they apply in all
I c r i m i n a l cases if no s t a t u t e o r rule c o n f l i c t s , and if
t h e r e 1 s — i n this particular c a s e , the C o u r t knows of no
I c o n f l i c t i n g rule or s t a t u t e , and so

p u r s u a n t to Rule 50 of

6

the U t a h Rules of Civil P r o c e d u r e , I'm going to grant a

7

judgment n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the v e r d i c t , w h i c h in effect w i l l

8

set aside the conviction o f the Class A m i s d e m e a n o r , guilty

9

of assault on a peace o f f i c e r , and w i l l find y o u guilty o f a

10 J lesser included o f f e n s e , Class B a s s a u l t .
I find that e s s e n t i a l l y , that y o u ' r e entitled to
12 I the ruling and the finding of simple assault as a m a t t e r of
13 J law and I'll give y o u some reasons for t h a t .
14

In other w o r d s , I find that essentially there w a s

15

not evidence that w o u l d justify t h e jury in finding that

16

O f f i c e r Durand w a s acting w i t h i n the s c o p e o f his a u t h o r i t y

17 as a peace officer at that time.
18

Let m e just read this.

T h e C o u r t rules as a

19

m a t t e r o f law that in this c a s e , O f f i c e r Durand w a s not

20

acting w i t h i n the s c o p e o f his authority as a p e a c e

21 J o f f i c e r at the time he w a s assaulted by t h e d e f e n d a n t .

The

22 | a s s a u l t would therefore b e $ Class B m i s d e m e a n o r , simple
23 I a s s a u l t , a lesser included offense of t h e C o u n t I.
24
25

T h e r e ' s no q u e s t i o n b u t w h a t t h e jury found y o u
guilty of a l l of the n e c e s s a r y elements o f a s s a u l t , the

1

Class B misdemeanor.

2

to find you guilty of assault on a peace officer, and that

3

was that the individual you assaulted was acting within the

4

scope of his authority as a peace officer, performing his

6

assigned duties as a peace officer.

6

element that I disagree with the jury, and that's the basis

7

for this ruling.

And that's the only

Utah Code Annotated 77-1-A-l states that the

8
9

One additional element was necessary

J duties of peace officers consist primarily of the prevention

10

and detection of crime and the enforcement of criminal

11

statutes and ordinances.

12

duties not be hindered or interferred with and therefore,

13

has increased the penalty imposed if a peace officer is

The legislature desires that such

14

I assaulted while performing such duties.

15

J

Now, police department rules and regulations may
require police officers to keep police vehicles washed and

17

I properly maintained.

These rules may also require that an

18 I officer be neat in his appearance, with a proper hair cut
19

and clean uniforms.

20

so he can perform his law enforcement duties, but they are

21

not the type of duties given special consideration and

22

protection under the law*

23

Such activities may prepare an officer

If an off-duty peace officer were assaulted as he

24

sat in the barber's chair, or as he was picking up his

25

uniforms from the dry cleanersr or as he was washing his

j patrol car, the assault would be the same type of assault as
would take place on an ordinary citizen who may be doing the
exact same thing*
In this case, Officer Durand was simply washing a
car on this Sunday morning.

He was not on duty, not in

uniform and in no way was seeking to prevent or detect
crime or enforce any criminal statute or ordinance.
8

9

(

Under these circumstances, when the defendant
assaulted Officer Durand, the defendant committed a simple

10

assault, a Class B misdemeanor.

11

the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of

The Court therefore finds

12

J assault, a Class B misdemeanor, notwithstanding the verdict

13

l of the jury in this matter

14

So, there are two charges that you're now

15

convicted of, and it's time for sentencing.

16

be simple assault, Count II would be interferring in arrest,

17

I both Class B misdemeanors.

18
19

Count I would

Is there anything you'd like to say before I
impose sentence?

20

MR. CARLSEN:

No. Other than I believe I'm the

21

one that was assaulted during this incident.

22

required to post bail, I had to pay $130 medical expenses

23

| from being strangled.

24
25

I—I was

THE COURT: Anything that you'd like to say,
Mr. Wyatt?

1

KR. WYATT:

No.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3

Nothing, your Honor.
Kr. Wyatt, you've made a motion

that I open up the records, you made a motion in objection

4

to that.

I didn't choose to rule o n — e i t h e r way on that

5

motion, so I'm not saying they could be opened.

6

saying this is the way the statute actually is worded, that

7

I the Court may open it up.

8

Now, all right.

9

I'm just

I've chosen not to do that.
This will be the sentence

J Mr. Carlsen, on the Count I, the simple assault, and I want
The Court f s going to impose a

10

you to hear this out.

11

thousand dollar fine and 180 days in jail.

12

suspend $700 of the fine and all of the jail, on payment of

13

a $300 fine and a $75 legislative assessment.

14

j condition of probation which I'll state.

15

I

I'm going to

And on

Consecutive with that sentence is the sentence

1

$ I on the interferring in the arrest., the Count II, and on that

17

| also, I'm going to impose a thousand dollar fine and 180

18

days in jail.

19

of the jail, on payment of a $300 fine and a $75 legislative

20

assessment, and on condition of.probation.

21

This is the probation:

For one year, you're on

22

informal probation to the Court.

During that year, there

I'll suspend $700 of that fine o n — a n d

all

23 I are to be no violations of any Federal, State or local law,
24 j except maybe a minor traffic ticket.
25

If you have a valid

license and you got a speeding ticket or a stop sign or a red

1

light ticket, that would not violate this probation; but any

2

DUI# reckless driving, revocation or suspension charge,

3

that would, or certainly any type of evading or anything

4

like that.

5

Now, as indicated, those sentences run consecu-

6

tive, so actually, if you violate that probation, you should

7

be aware that there could be an additional $1,400 in

8

fines and a year in jail, and so I urge and encourage you

9

to avoid any type of violation of your probation.

10
11

Now, if my figures are correct, that's a total of
$750.

Do you want to pay that at a hundred a month?

12

MR, CARLSEN: Yes.

13

THE COURT: When do you want to make your first

14

payment?

15

MR. CARLSEN:

16

THE COURT:

The 1st of December.

Let's set it up on the 5th of the

17

month.

18

month thereafter, you pay $100 or more each month until all

19

of the fine and assessments are paid.

20

j

Starting the 5th of December and the 5th of each

If you donft make the required payment on or before

21

the day it's due, you appear in Court on the day it's due at

22

9:C0 ofclock to explain why you haven't paid it; otherwise,

23

you could be held in contempt for disobeying the order.

24

Do you have any questions?

25

MR. CARLSEN: No.

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. CARLSEN:

3

All right.
All right*

(Whereupon, this sentencing hearing was concluded.)

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Thank you.

* * *

1

I

TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE

2
3
4

I, T o m Frye, do hereby certify that I am a
5

I transcriber for Penny C. Abbott, Certified Shorthand

6

J Reporter, License No, 93, and Certified Court Transcriber

7

of tape recorded court proceedings; that I received the
8 I electronically recorded tape of the within matter and under
9

10

J her supervision have transcribed the same into typewriting,
and the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 9, inclusive,

n

to the best of my ability constitute a full, true and correct]

12
13

transcription, except where it is indicated the tape
| recorded court proceedings were inaudible.

14
15
16

DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 11th day of
December, 1991.

17
18
19

21 I

transcriber

22
23
24
25

10

1
2
3

C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

}

ss,

4

I, PENNY C. ABBOTT, a Certified Shorthand
5

Reporter, do hereby certify that I received the
6

electronically recorded tape (No, 91-457; in the matter of
7

Logan City, plaintiff, v s . David Craig CarIsen, defendant,
8

and that I caused it to be transcribed into typewriting,
9
10
11
12

and that a full, true, and correct transcription of said
hearing so recorded and transcribed is set forth in the
foregoing pages numbered from 1 to 9, inclusive, and that

13

said pages constitute an accurate and complete transcriptioiji

14

[of all the proceedings adduced at the hearing and contained

15

p n the tgipe except where it is indicated that the proceeding

16

Has inaudible.

17
18

WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake
tity, Utah, this 11th day of December, 1991.

19
20
21
22
23
24

*ennv C. /Abbot t ,*•> G. S'lTS, * /.
License #93
My commission expires:
September 24, 1992

^mP
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(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to
present any information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in his absence, he
may likewise be sentenced in his absence. If a defendant fails to appear for
sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to appeal and the
time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make his return on the commitment and file it with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.
Cross-References. — Pre-sentence investigation, § 76-5-404.
Rules of evi<i€nCe inapplicable to sentencing
and probation proceedings. Rule 1101, U.RE.

Rule 23

Suspending imposition of sentence and placing defendant on probation, § 77-18-1.
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Rule 23. Arrest of judgment.
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the
facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon
arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense charged is entered or jeopardy ha s attached, order a commitment until
the defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may
be just and proper under the circumstances.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Challenge to jurisdiction.
Grounds.
Mental illness.
Prosecutorial misconduct
Standard.
Variance between charge and verdict.
Cited.
Challenge to jurisdiction.
Jurisdictional question was properly raised
by motion in arrest of judgment. State v. Merritt, 67 Utah 325, 247 P. 497 (1926).
Grounds.
A judgment may be arrested based on an insufficiency of the evidence or facts as proved in
trial or as admitted by the parties. State v^
Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App. 1991),
affd, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993).
An arrest of judgment is appropriate where
the verdict is based on inherently improbable
evidence. State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), affd, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah
1993).
Mental illness.

grounds for a new trial, not an arrest of judgment, even though defendant's motion for arrest of judgment or in the alternative for a new
trial was made before imposition of sentence.
State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
Standard.
A trial court may arrest a jury verdict when
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of the
crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element.
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983);
State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982);
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976);
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993).
Variance between charge and verdict
Although the verdict form signed by the jury
foreman stated that the defendant was guilty
of "forcible sexual assault" and the information
had charged the defendant with "aggravated
sexual assault," the variance did not justify the
granting of a motion to arrest judgment on the
basis of uncertainty as to what the jury in"—-J-J- - -

-—.««. « « tV»o iiiT-w v A r H i r t form does
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Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d
1255.
Validity and construction of constitution or
statute authorizing exclusion of public in sex
offense cases, 39 A.L.R.3d 852.
Right of accused to have press or other media
representatives excluded from criminal trial,
49 A.L.R.3d 1007.

Rules 78 to 80.

Rule 81

Power of court to impose standard of personal appearance or attire, 73 A.L.R.3d 353.
What amounts to "appearance" under statute or rule requiring notice, to party who has
"appeared," of intention to take default judgment, 73 A.L.R.3d 1250.
Applicability of judicial immunity to acts of
clerk of court under state law, 34 A.L.R.4th
1186.
Key Numbers. — Clerks of Courts «= 24, 66;
Courts «=> 61 et seq.; Judgment <s= 276; Motions
«=» 57; Trial <s=> 5, 20.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Rule 78, relating to motion day,
Rule 79, relating to books and records kept by
the clerk, and Rule 80, relating to reporters

and record transcripts, were repealed by order
of the Supreme Court, effective May 1, 1991.

PART XI.
GENERAL PROVISIONS.
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general.
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules shall apply to all special
statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part
of the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance
with these rules.
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedings
in uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all proceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement
of any judgment or order entered.
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts. These rules shall apply
to civil actions commenced in the city or justice courts, except insofar as such
rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable to such courts or proceedings
therein.
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administrative board or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice and procedure
in appealing from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of
an administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in conflict or inconsistent with these rules.
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall
also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict
with any statutory or constitutional requirement.
City courts. — Former § 78-4-32, as enacted by L. 1977, ch. 77, § 1, transferred the
jurisdiction and powers of the city courts to the
municipal departments of the circuit courts.
For circuit court jurisdiction generally, see Title 78, Chapter 4.

Cross-References. — Administrative Rulemaking Act, § 63-46a-l et seq.
Circuit courts generally, § 78-4-1 et seq.
Justice courts generally, § 78-5-101 et seq.
Uniform Probate Code, Title 75.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Administrative proceedings.
City and justices' courts.
Criminal proceedings.
Special statutory proceedings.
Cited.
Administrative proceedings.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are inapplicable to a proceeding before an administra-

tive body seeking to regulate activities burdened with a public interest. Entre Nous Club
v. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P.2d 670 (1955).
Rule 6(e) is not inconsistent with, nor clearly
inapplicable to, the procedure of the Industrial
Commission and therefore supplements the
procedure of the Commission. Griffith v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 264, 399 P.2d 204
(1965).
Where road commission's order that sign be

ale 50- Motion for a directed verdict ana IUI j u u & « . —
notwithstanding the verdict.
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves
r a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may
fer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having
served the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not
sen made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a
aiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for
Lrected verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific
round(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed
erdict is effective without any assent of the jury.
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a moion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for
my reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to
he jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the
notion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has
noved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his
motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party,
within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict
was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested
verdict had been directed or may order a new trial.
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion.
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided
for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on
tVip motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be
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motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon
does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new
trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally
denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in
accordance with the order of the appellate court.
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate
court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment,
nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether a
new trial shall be granted.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 50, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Directed verdict
T general
Anneal
——After failure to seek.
Nunc p r o tunc
Evidence.

the losing party, the directed verdict cannot be
sustained. Management Comm. of Graystone
^* ne Homeowners Ass'n ex rel. Owners of Condominiums v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d
896 (Utah

1982)

^
Supreme Court will sustain the grantm
& °^ a m o t i ° n f° r a directed verdict only if the
evidence was such that reasonable men could
ne

(1) (a) "Feace omcer means any employee ui a ww ciuui^iuw^ ~&™*y.
is part of or administered by the state or any of its political subdivisions
and whose duties consist primarily of the prevention and detection of
crime and the enforcement of criminal statutes or ordinances of this state
or any of its political subdivisions,
(b) "Peace officer" specifically includes the following:
(i) any sheriff or deputy sheriff, police officer, or marshal of any
county, city, or town;
(ii) the commissioner of public safety and any member ot the
Department of Public Safety certified as a peace officer;
(iii) all persons specified in Section 23-20-1.5;
(iv) any police officer employed by any college or university;
(v) investigators for the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division;
(vi) special agents or investigators for the attorney general, district
attorneys, and county attorneys;
m
(vii) employees of the Department of Natural Resources designated
as peace officers by law; and
(viii) school district police officers as designated by the board ot
education for the school district;
(ix) the executive director of the Department of Corrections and
any correctional enforcement or investigative officer designated by the
executive director and approved by the commissioner of public safety
and certified by the Peace Officers Standards and Training Division;
(x) members of a law enforcement agency established by a private
college or university provided that the college or university has been
certified by the commissioner of public safety according to rules of the
Department of Public Safety.
, . . * * , _
*u •*,
(2) Peace officers have statewide peace officer authority, but the authority
extends to other counties, cities, or towns only when they are acting under
Title 77 Chapter 9, Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit. This limitation does not
apply to'any peace officer employed by the state. The authority of peace officers
employed by the Department of Corrections is regulated by Title 64, Chapter
13, Department of Corrections — State Prison.

10-3-914. Police officers — Authority.
(1) Within the boundaries of the municipality, police officers have the same
authority as deputy sheriffs, including at all times the authority to preserve
the public peace, prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress riots,
protect persons and property, remove nuisances existing in the public streets,
roads, and highways, enforce every law relating to the suppression of offenses,
and perform all duties required of them by ordinance or resolution.
(2) This section is not a limitation of a police officer's statewide authority as
otherwise provided by law.
History: C. 1953, 10-3-914, enacted by L. same powers and responsibilities as consta1977, ch. 48, § 3; 1990, ch. 44, § 2.
bles" and "including at all times the authority"
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- for w It shall be the duty of the police force in
ment, effective April 23, 1990, designated the
any municipality at all times," and made a
previously undesignated language as Subsec- m i n o r p U n c t u a t i o n change,
ion 1 ; added Subsection (2); and, in SubsecCross-References. - Duties of special DOtion (1), combined together the former two seni:„^ 0 „ ™ : „ * ^ u„ „ M t A
s an io A
llC
b
tences, substituted W i t h i n the boundaries of
£ ******
J *ove™r>
67-12-4.
the municipality, police officers have the same
£ e a < * ° £ , C e r f s ^ a t " > n > * J J ' 1 * " 1 e t ***•
authority as deputy sheriffs" for "The police
£eace of!lcer ^ ^
§ f- 15 " 1 e t * * P o w e r s of
officers of any municipality shall have the
«**aMes f § 17-25-1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Classification of office of policeman.
Trespass by officers.

licemen were not to be regarded merely as
agents or servants of municipality, but rather
as public or state officers. Everill v. Swan, 17
Utah 514, 55 P. 68 (1898).

Classification of office of p o l i c e m a n .
For the purpose of a former statute providing
that appointed officers in cities and towns
should hold their respective offices until their
successors were appointed and qualified, po-

T r e s p a s s by officers.
If power conferred upon officer by this seetion is not regularly pursued, officer is guilty of
a trespass. Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 57
P.2d 1128 (1926).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

(1) Assault is:
anotii^ a t t e m p t ' ^

l a w f u l force or violence, to do bodily injury to

(b) a threat accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
clCLT act> ^ ^ ^ t e d ^ t h unlawful force or violence, that causes or
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
19?i9S^2Ci S K S ^ 8 ? Y ^
^
75 | 3
38,1989, ch. 51, J 1; 1991, eh.

A — * » « * N o t - . - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted 'or

Repeal* and R e v e t m e n t s . - Laws
1974, ch. 32, § 38 repealed former § 76-5-102

%£?
" S U b s t a D t i a l ™ k of " m S u b s e c t i o n
Cross-Referpn^x
n.„ »,-• i.-

relating to assault, and enacted present § 76-

Power of city to prohibit a s L l t L

battery.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer.
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace
officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as
a peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
History: G.1953,76-5-102.4, enacted by L.
1974, ch. 32, $ 32; 1987, ch. 23, § 1.
Cross-References. — Assault on conservation officer, § 23-20-26.

Peace officers. Title 77, Chapter la.

76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and
interferes with the arrest or detention by:
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful
order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or
(3) ""the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-305, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 62, § 1; 1990, ch. 274, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1981, ch. 62, § 1 repealed former § 76-8-305,

as enacted by § 76-8-305, relating to interference with law enforcement official seeking to
detain interferor or another, and enacted
present § 76-8-305.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
.
Constitutionality.
Pe^cVofi^re
Unlawful search of premises.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Former § 76-8-305 (L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8305), which made it unlawful to interfere intentionally with recognized law enforcement official seeking to detain interferor or another,
regardless of whether there was legal basis for
arrest, was unconstitutionally vague. State v.
Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975).

and subsequent interference with arrest by
fellow student was not resistance or obstruction
o f officer m

d i s c h a r g e o f duty> S t a t e e x

rel

Lawful arrest.
University security officer who arrested student in area where sole interests of university
were location of fraternity and religious institute for students was not discharging, or at-

Hurley, 28 Utah 2d 248, 501 P.2d 111 (1972).
Peace officers.
Game wardens were by law peace officers
w
^ ° ^ a ^ s a m e power and followed same procedure
» making arrests as other peace officers.
State v. Sandman, 4 Utah 2d 69, 286 P.2d 1060
(1955).
, TT , __e_ ,
Unlawful search of premises.
Defendants convictions of assaulting a peace
officer a n d
interfering with a peace officer were
affirmed, where the officer was acting within
the scope of his authority in responding to a
complaint regarding a party where minors
were consuming alcohol, even though his attempted search of the premises was later found
to be unlawful. State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568

-

aitah 1991>.
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77-1-4. Conviction to precede punishment.
No person shall be punished for a public oflfense until convicted in a court
having jurisdiction.
ffistory: C. 1953, 77-1-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References, — No person to oe de-

77-1-6

prived of life or liberty without due process of
law. Utah Const,, Art. I, § 7.

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
COLLATERAL REI^RENCES

CJUS. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law >j 21.

77-1-6, Rights of defendant.
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) lb appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) lb receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
(c) lb testify in his own behalf;
(d) lb be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) lb have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in
his behalf;
(0 lb a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district
where the offense is alleged to have been committed;
(g) lb the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) lb be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail
and if the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a
husband against his wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a
magistrate.
History: C 1953, 77-1-5, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2,
Cirtss-References. — Attorneys, rights in
disbarment proceedings, § 78-51-16.
Constitutional rights of accused, Utah
Const. Art L § 12.
t nn oty ^ A
Counsel for indigents, § 77-32-1 et seq.
Discharge of defendant turned stated witness, § 77-17-2.
Dismissal without trial, Rule 25, U.R.Cr.R
Due process of law, Utah Const, Art I, § 7.
Errors and defects not affecting substantial
rights disregarded, Rule 30, U.R.Cr.P.

Husband or wife not competent witness
against or for each other without consent, exceptions, { 78-24-8.
J u r y ^ j a n d w a i v e r thereof, Utah Const,
Art. I, § 10; Rule 17, UitCr.P.
Lineup p i ^ u r e s ' , } 77-8-1 et seq.
w u- i
J
J J ui _J
. ^ultipte Prosecutions and double jeopardy,
§ 6 1 401 e t
l ; "
*?*
.
A .
„ Ordinance violation cases, jeopardy in, § 10' "^5Subpoena for witnesses for impecunious defendant in criminal case, § 21-5-14.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Appearance at trial in prison clothing.
-Waiver of
right.
Confrontation of witness.
—Depositions.

—Testimony at former trial.
-Testimony at preliminary hearing.
of
^
accusation.
—Bill of particulars.
Double j'eopardy.
—Retrial Drooer.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons,]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
a]

AMENDMENT V

[1791]

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless f on|aj
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or inMth^
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject foljtnl?
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case^to'li>ej
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,~liberty, or property, without due process of law^fnor]
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
~™

~ ~

AMENDMENT XIV

•

.'•,•.•-••

- — =

•

—

•

—

—

_

_

_

?

[1868]

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of .life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person.within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section-2.r^'Representatives -shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State excluding Indians not taxed.
But when the right to vote at any election for : ^e choice of electors for President and Vice President of
the United States, Representatives in Congress," the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the
members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to;any of the male inhabitants of such State, being
twenty-one years of age, and .citizens of ,* the ^United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation,in rebellion,; or£otner;crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion^which the nuinberTofpsuch male "citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such Stater
Section 3.^No person shaH be^a*^
Congress, of electbrof President'and
Vice Presiden^or hold anyjoffice^civil o r j n ^ t a i y ^
States, or under any State, who
having previously taken Juibath^^
arias a
member of.any,State^legislatoe^r,as^^^
officer of ^anyj&a^rto^suppo^^he
Constitution of the United States,-, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion, against the same, or
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Kreitel from denial of summary judgment
in a personal injury case.
One Steve J. Liss filed a personal injury
action against defendants George Kreitel,
John Doe No. 1 and John Doe No. 2 seeking damages for personal injuries suffered
in an accident while plaintiff was drilling
a water well on petitioner's land in Carter
County, Montana. The action was filed in
the district court of the sixteenth judicial
district of the State of Montana, Carter
County, before the Honorable Alfred B.
Coate, District Judge. Answer was filed
and depositions were taken from plaintiff,
his wife and the three defendants. Thereafter defendants moved for a summary
judgment on the basis that their affirmative defense of assumption of risk was established as a matter of law. Judge Coate
denied defendants' motion for summary
judgment.

Also see Duchesneau et al. v. Silver Bow
County et al. v. Mack Trucks, Inc. et al.,
28 St.Rep. 732.
In the instant case there are several issues of material fact requiring submission
to a jury for their determination and these
issues cannot be determined as a matter of
law. The existence or nonexistence of a
valid defense of assumption of risk depends upon establishing certain facts upon
which said defense is predicated. These
facts have not been established as a matter
of law.
Accordingly the petition for supervisory
control is denied and the petition dismissed.

O

Following the ex parte presentation and
filing of the writ for supervisory control
herein by defendants below, this Court issued its order to show cause and heard argument from counsel for both parties,
thereafter taking the matter under advisement.
Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. provides a standard for determining if summary judgment
should be granted in this language:
«* * * The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. * * * "
A succinct statement of the controlling
principle under this rule is found at 3 Barron & Holtzoff—Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 1234, p. 122:
' T h e question to be decided on a motion for summary judgment is whether
there is a genuine issue of fact and not
how that issue should be determined.
The hearing on the motion is not a trial.
* * *»

| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM,

The STATE of Montana, Plaintiff

and Appellant,
v.
Kenneth A. LeCOURE, Defendant
and Respondent.

No. 12087.
Supreme Court of Montana.
Submitted Dec. 1, 1971.
Decided Dec. 20, 1971.

The Second Judicial District Court,
Silver Bow County, John B. McClernan, J.t
entered order granting defense motion to
dismiss a second-degree assault information on ground that defendant had already
been placed in jeopardy in federal court,
and State appealed. The Supreme Court,
John C. Harrison, } . , Yield that deiendant
who had been charged in federal court
with assaulting an FBI agent engaged in
performance of his official duties but acquitted for failure to show that agent was
acting in his official capacity when assault

STATE v. LeCOURE
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could not be prosecuted in state
second-degree assault charge arisf same transaction.
rmed.

Law <§=>20l
mdant who had been charged in
:ourt with assaulting an FBI agent
in performance of his official duacquitted for failure to show that
as acting in his official capacity
sault occurred could not be prosestate court on second-degree asarge arising out of same transac;U.S.C.A.§§ 111,1114.

t L. Woodahl, Atty. Gen., J. C.
rtner, Deputy Atty. Gen., argued,
Lawrence G. Stimatz, County
f. Brian Tierney, Deputy County
.rgued, Butte, for plaintiff and apmd, Holland & Haxby, David L.
I, argued, Butte, for defendant and
lent.

N C. HARRISON, Justice.
appeal arises from an order grantlotion to dismiss a second degree asnformation, on the grounds defendi been "once in jeopardy".
facts giving rise to the case a r e :
[. Bassett, a Federal Bureau of Inition (FBI) agent assigned to the
office, on September 13, 1969, upon
I in Butte from a trip to Bozeman,
is government vehicle to the govern^arage. H e picked up his own vehid proceeded to the local FBI office
n in some equipment and sign out.
irked his vehicle in a reserved area
ihortly thereafter defendant backed
ckup into the front of Bassett's vehimsing considerable damage. Defendid not stop after the accident Howdue to a stop sign at an intersection

he stopped and Bassett, who had followed
defendant's car on foot in an attempt to
get the license number of the vehicle which
had damaged his vehicle, was confronted
by defendant. Defendant struck Bassett
causing him to be hospitalized for fractures of the cheek bone and for dental surgery.
Thereafter an agent of the FBI, one Hal
Vogalsang, contacted Mark Sullivan, the
county attorney of Silver Bow County, in
regard to filing charges in the state court
on the alleged assault. He later informed
Mr. Sullivan that a decision had been made
to prosecute the defendant in the federal
court, rather than in the state court. The
matter was submitted to a federal grand
jury which issued the following true bill:
' T h a t on or about the 13th day of September, 1969, at Butte, in the State and
District of Montana, K E N N E T H ALBERT LeCOURE did forcibly assault
Fred J. Bassett by striking said Fred J.
Bassett with his fist or other object, the
said Fred J. Bassett then and there being
an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a person designated in Section 1114 of Title 18, United States
Code, engaged in and on account of the
performance of his official duties. Said
assault in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§111
and 1114."
The case went to trial before Judge
Murray, sitting with a jury, on May 25,
1970. After the jury had been empaneled
and the government had completed its case
and rested, the defendant through counsel
moved the court for judgment of acquittal.
On May 26, 1970, Judge Murray granted
the motion and stated to the j u r y :
"COURT Ladies and gentlemen of the
jury, yesterday at the close of the government's case, the defense made a motion for acquittal on the grounds and for
the reasons that the Government had
failed to prove the charge made. As you
understand, this is a Federal case and in
order for the government to prove its
case, it must prove that the person as-
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saulted, Mr. Bassett, was at the time of
the assault engaged in or on account of
the performance, he was assaulted while
he was engaged in or on account of the
performance of his official duties.
"Now, the testimony was that Mr.
Bassett went to the truck of the defendant for the purpose of getting a name
and license number in order to have the
information in the event his own truck
had been damaged. Now, that had nothing to do with his official duties, and as
a result of that, no federal law has been
violated.
"It is unfortunate, of course, that at
this point we cannot proceed further, but
there's no sense in proceeding further, to
receive the testimony of the defense; of
course, as of this time and under the
state of the evidence as it now exists,
there certainly exists cause for the State
to bring an action against the defendant
for assault, just as any individual may
be subjected to assault when he strikes
any other citizen or any other individual.
"So while we are not at liberty to
guess the guilt of the defendant, because
he hasn't had an opportunity to present
his evidence, still the matter should be
presented in my opinion, to a jury in a
proper case and for the jury to determine as to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant herein involved.
"So as I say because from the evidence it is clear that Mr. Bassett was
acting not in the performance of his official duties, but for his own benefit to
get—to protect his own property, so to
speak, just to get the name and license
number so that in the event his vehicle
—he didn't even know, apparently, at
that point whether his truck had been
damaged, or his car, but in any event he
wanted to get that information for the
purpose of just having it in order to
maybe recover in the event his car had
been damaged.
"So judgment—the motion for judgment of acquittal is granted, and you la-

dies and gentlemen I thank you for having served as jurors to this extent."
On May 27, 1970, judgment of acquittal
was entered.
Eleven months later, on April 27, 197j
an Information charging defendant with a
felony, towit—assault in the second degree
was filed in Silver Bow County. Defendant did not enter a plea, but submitted to
the court a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that "prosecution is barred under
the laws of the State of Montana and of
the Constitutions of the United States and
the State of Montana." After a hearing
on the motion and the matter briefed for
the trial court by both parties, the motion
to dismiss was granted.
The only issue before this Court is
whether the disposition of the case by the
federal court bars the state from filing
similar charges in the state court.
Under the fact situation here, the answer
must be in the affirmative. The state in
its argument refers to the disposition of
the case in the federal court as a dismissal.
The record in the federal courts shows a
judgment of acquittal. The state would
have this Court take the position that the
reason the case was filed in the state court
is that the federal court lacked jurisdiction.
The record in the federal court is to the
contrary. Here, an indictment was returned in the federal district court; defendant was arrested; he appeared and entered a plea of not guilty. At this point
the question of jurisdiction did not arise
for obviously the federal court did feel it
had jurisdiction.
What the United States district attorney's office failed to prove was that Bassett was acting in his official capacity
when the assault occurred; that failure,
not, as it argues here, a failure of jurisdiction, was fatal. Defendant was in jeopardy and nothing can breathe new life into
a criminal action against him in the state
courts.
Here, in the federal court defendant was
charged with assaulting Fred J. Bassett, an
agent of the FBI, engaged in and on ac-
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it of the performance of his official
»s. The charge in the state court was
ond degree assault". The difference in
wording of the two charging docuts does not change the fact that the
ge arose out of the "same transaction",
e v. McDonald, Mont., 491 P.2d 711.
hose who had to make the decision into
:h court or jurisdiction they would
g the case had a choice—state or fedHaving elected to proceed in the

federal court, whatever the motive, and the
defendant having been acquitted there,
they can not now have another try—at the
expense of defendant.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
JAMES T. HARRISON, C. J., and
HASWELL, DALY and CASTLES, JJ.,
concur.

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN
Defendant in Pro Se
P.O. Box 148
Logan, Utah 84323-0148
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CORRECT

Plaintiff,

:
SENTENCE

-vs-

:

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,

:

Defendant.

:

Case No. 911000628

COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, David Craig Carlsen,
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 22(e) of the Utah.Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and hereby respectfully moves this Honorable
Court to correct the illegal sentence or the sentence which was
imposed in an illegal manner in the above-entitled matter.
The basis for this motion is that the judgment and sentence
imposed by the Court in the above-entitled matter for the offense(s)
of Assault and or Assault upon a Peace Officer were illegal and
or imposed in an illegal manner for the following reasons:
1.

The jury verdict and the Defendants conviction for the

offense of Assault upon a Peace Officer was set aside by the Court
on grounds of insufficient evidence on November 15, 1991.

2.

The Defendant has never been convicted by any Court or

by any jury of the offense of Simple Assault in violation of
U.C.A. § 76-5-102, (1953 as amended) and the Defendant was sentenced
and punished for such offense of which he has not been convicted
in a Court or by a jury having jurisdiction which violates the
provisions of U.C.A. § 77-1-4, (1980 Amendment).

The offense of

Assault is not a lesser included offense of the offense of Assault
upon a Peace Officer because the defenses available to a Defendant
charged with Assault are different than the defenses available to
a Defendant charged with Assault upon a Peace Officer as established
by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568
(Utah 1991).

The Defendant in the instant case was not charged by

Information for the offense of Assault where he could present to
a jury the defenses to the offense of Assault and no jury has
rendered a decision of guilt against the Defendant based upon such
charge and the defenses available to the Defendant had he been
charged with such offense.
3.

The Court setting aside the jury verdict on the offense

of Assault upon a Peace Officer on November 15, 1991 on grounds of
insufficient evidence constituted an acquittal and the Court was
barred under the Double Jeopardy Clauses and Due Process Clauses
under Article I, § 7 and Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution
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and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution from entering a judgment of guilt without trial
to the offense of Assault and imposing sentence thereon over
Defendant's objections in Judge's Chambers to such a Motion by
the Court prior to imposition of sentence.
4.

The written Judgment and Sentence signed by the Court

does not conform to the sentence verbally imposed by the Court
on November 15, 1991.
5.

The Court lacked jurisdiction to impose and enter a

judgment and sentence for the offense of Assault because the
judgment is not based upon the verdict of the jury and the verdict
of the jury was responsive to the issues joined by the Information
and the plea of the Defendant on trial thereto.
6.

The Defendant hereby requests an immediate hearing on

this Motion to Correct Sentence.

DATED this 17th day of December, 1993.
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DAVID C&AIG CARLrfEN
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